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THE MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES.*

The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute is one of the
major works in criminal law. It has had a remarkable impact since its
completion in 1962. More tha~ half of the states have expressly relied
on the Code, 1 numerous other states have been influenced by it in their
recent codifications, and innumerable court decisions have discussed the
provisions of the Code. 2 One of the difficulties with the Code stemmed
from the fact that the original Commentaries to it were completed in
1962.3 In the two decades since the Code came out there have been
tremendous changes in the substantive criminal law which were not reflected in the earlier commentaries to the Code. Many states have substantially limited the application of the felony-murder rule. 4 With
respect to the death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has been
extremely active, holding that the "sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual
punishment,''5 and further holding that death penalty statutes are only
constitutional if they "guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable
the process for imposing a sentence of death." 6 In other areas as well,
the changes have been dramatic. Some states have begun to consider
the possibility, at least, of convicting a husband for the rape of his wife, 7
* © 1982 by Paul Marcus. The excellent research assistance of Helen Gunn, University
of Illinois College of Law, Class of 1983 is gratefully acknowledged.
1 According to the revised commentaries, 34 "state codifications or revisions have now
drawn upon the Model." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES XI (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES].
2 The Code was also quite influential in the drafting of the proposed revised Federal
Criminal Code, currently pending in Congress as H.R. 4711 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
3 Thirteen tentative drafts with accompanying comments were considered between 1953
and 1962.
4 See i'n.fta text accompanying notes 73-97.
5 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
6 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
7 &e, e.g., OR. REv. STAT.§ 163.375 (1979) which provides: "(1) A person who has sex811
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and in most jurisdictions the problem of criminal actions revolving
around child custody disputes has intensified. 8
Professor Peter Low as Reporter and Professor John Jeffries as Associate Reporter, both from the University of Virginia School of Law,
have provided a great service by revising and updating these commentaries. Their work began in 1976 and took almost five years; this tremendous effort is reflected in a fine product spanning three volumes.
In this article I will analyze the Code, along with the Commentaries, as found in the first of these volumes, "Offenses Involving Danger to
the Person."9 Four separate topics are dealt with in this volume: Criminal Homicide (Article 210); Assault, Reckless Endangering, Threats (Article 211); Kidnapping and Related Offenses, Coercion (Article 212);
and Sexual Offenses (Article 213). I will focus attention on the first of
these topics.
This review is restricted to an evaluation of the homicide materials
solely because of time and space constraints. Such a restriction is unfortunate, as important issues continue to arise in the other three areas and
are well analyzed by the commentators. In the death penalty area
much discussion is given to the questions of the role of the jury in imposing the penalty, the type of homicide which should be the subject of the
penalty, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 10 The
materials dealing with rape focus attention on the proof problems, the
question of the desirability of gender neutral language in a rape statute, 11 and grading of statutes which impose certain age limitations for
ual intercourse with a female commits the crime of rape in the first degree if: (a) The female
is subjected to forcible compulsion by the male."
8 Section 212.4 of the Code provides, in part, that an offense is committed if the defendant "knowlingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age of 18 from the custody
of its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian when he has no privilege to do so." Se-e
discussion in COMMENTARIES, supra note I, at 249-52, 257-61.
9 The other two volumes deal with offenses against property (arson, burglary, robbery,
theft, forgery), offenses against the family (bigamy, incest) and offenses against public administration (bribery, perjury, obstructing governmental operations, abuse of office) or against
public order and decency (riot, disorderly conduct, obscenity).
10 See discussion in COMMENTARIES, supra note I, at 110-71.
II The commentators discuss this point:
There are a number of features of the Michigan statute that should be noted in
contrast to the Model Code. Perhaps the most striking is the avoidance of gender specificity in the Michigan statute and the grading consequences of such an approach. Rape
by a female upon a male or another female and rape by a male upon another male are
treated in Michigan at the same level of seriousness as rape by a male upon a female.
There is symbolic importance in the introduction of such an equivalence into the law.
There are also cases where the trauma of rape may be just as great as in the male imposition upon a female to which the most serious form of the offense has been traditionally
confined. But the fact remains, as reflected in the Model Penal Code, that rape is perceived as such a serious crime because of the frequency of attacks by males upon females
and because of the peculiar harms generally associated with that form of the offense.
Undoubtedly the serious sanctions of the Michigan statute are designed with that case in
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sexual relations with an underage victim. 12 Finally, in the assault area
the Code "undertakes a substantial restructing of prior law. It eliminates the common law categories and many of the antecedent statutory
variations in favor of a single integrated provision." 13
It is in the homicide area, however, that the Model Penal Code has
had perhaps the greatest impact. In bringing uniformity to an inconsistent body oflaw, in taking positions on controversial substantive areas, 14
and in developing a grading system which brings important policy considerations into the forefront of the punishment decisions, the Code's
contribution is significant. It is to this contribution that we now turn.
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE

The draftsmen of the Code chose to deal with a host of subjects
under the rubric of "criminal homicide." Analysis of responsibility for
aiding the suicide attempts of another, a view of the capital punishment
quandry, and a discussion of negligent homicide are but a few of the
areas discussed. In this portion of the article, I will explore in some
detail three subjects of particular importance: the definitions of criminal homicide, murder, .and manslaughter.
The Model Penal Code, section 210.1, provides that:
"(1) A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human
being.
(2) Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or negligent
homicide."
There are three striking features of the homicide definition. 15 The
first is not apparent from a reading of§ 210.1, but rather is one emphasized by the commentators. The Code simply requires that the actor
cause the death of the victim. 16 It thus "renders unnecessary the ancient
requirement that death of another take place within a year and a day of
mind and will in fact be imposed in such cases in all but a very few instances. Nevertheless, as an abstract proposition, the question of whether a rape statute should be drafted
in sex neutral terms seems a close one . . . . (I]t may well be that the Michigan approach
is the more desirable.
/d. at 294.
12 The rape materials are discussed id. at 274-356.
13 ld. at 183.
14 Controversial substantive areas of the law which the Model Penal Code has taken a
position on are the grading of murder into degrees and the felony murder rule.
15 As might be expected, however, there are other features that are important as well, such
as the limitation of homicide to actions which the defendant causes purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently; and the division of criminal homicide into but three categories of
murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide.
16 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 9.
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the actor's conduct," 17 the so-called year-and-a-day rule.
By the Eighteenth Century, and indeed much earlier, we find a general
assumption that a homicide could be prosecuted as such only if the death
occurred within a year and a day of the act; this was distinct from any
question of the period of limitations for commencing a prosecution. . . .
The standard, if perhaps unhistorical, explanatjon of the rule, often repeated in the books, is that in the condition of medical science until recent
times, it would have been hard to establish convincingly a line of causation
between an act and a relatively distant death, and it was thus plausible to
make the presumption ('conclusive' as well as arbitrary) that a death more
than a year removed from the assault or similar antecedent arose from a
natural rather than the criminal cause. . . . Occasionally it has been
surmised that the rule was linked in some way to the early function of the
jury as reporters of the happenings of the vicinage who required no aid
from witnesses-but the jury would not have had knowledge sufficient to
trace cause to effect over a sizeable interval of time. . . . Again we find a
suggestion that the rule was intended simply to soften the old brutal law
regarding homicides. 18

The rule has been subject to considerable criticism and has been rejected by many legislators and courts. 19 As one New Jersey court put it:
The court recognize(s] advances in medical technology to which the law
must respond.
The acceptance or rejection of available medical technology and machines which can postpone the actual time of death, due whenever it occurs, as a result of wounds inflicted upon a victim, should not insulate the
assailant from trial and punishment for the crime.
The common law "year and a day rule" does not conform to presentday medical realities, principles of equity or public policy. We reject it as
an anachronism and declare that it is no longer part of the common law of
this State. 20

The second striking feature of the homicide definition is that the
Code does not define the crucial term "death." This omission is, in a
sense, justifiable because most states do not define the term in their penal codes and "because this delicate interplay between the criminal law
and the advances of medial science is yet too uncertain to reduce to
statutory formulation." 21 Such an approach by the draftsmen is too
facile. In many states today efforts are being made to codify the definition of the term; in still others, judges have had to wrestle with different
and conflicting definitions.
The commentators correctly note that in the vast majority of homiId.
18 Commonwealth v. Lewis, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1973, 409 N.E.2d 771, 772-73 (1980),
cert. dmi'ed, 450 U.S. 929 (1981).
19 But see, e.g., IDAHO CODE§ 18-4008 (1979); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 178,
166 A.2d 501, 512 (1960) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
20 State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 412-13, 372 A.2d 1117, 1121 (1977).
21 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 11.
17
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cide cases the meaning of death is not at issue. 22 In these cases, no matter what the definition, the victim is clearly dead. In other cases, where
the victim's condition is maintained through sophisticated medical technology, the question is a troublesome one. 23 The issue was well stated
by an English law professor, Ian Kennedy:
What is this discussion of death all about? Until comparatively recently,
there was no argument about when someone was dead. Death was defined
as "the absence of vital functions", breathing and heart beat. Then along
came machines which could maintain a patient's breathing. Polio victims
were among the beneficiaries of this development, since the so-called iron
lung could now breathe for them. Then there appeared machines which
could take over the functions of the heart and lungs for a while. Open
heart surgery, in which the heart may be stopped for a period of time,
became possible.
But inevitably a problem arose. If we regard someone as dead when
his vital functions are absent, what do we do with someone whose vital
functions are maintained by a machine and accompanying technology?
The polio victim isn't dead, nor is the patient undergoing heart surgery.
But the victim of a car accident whose head has been crushed is breathing
by means of a respirator though the respirator may be ventilating a corpse.
Clearly the machinery may mimic life when the patient is dead. 24

In this country the issue has begun to surface with some regularity,
as in the case of State v. Fierro. 25 The defendant there purposefully shot
Victor Corella in the head. Corella was taken to the hospital where
emergency surgery was performed. He was maintained on support systems for three days; at that point the systems were terminated and he
was pronounced dead. The court conceded that under the common law
test (which had been used up to that point in Arizona) he would not
have been legally dead, for "the body of the victim was breathing,
though not spontaneously, and blood was pulsating through his body
before the life support mechanisms were withdrawn." 26 Under the more
modern view of death, Corella had died three days before the systems
were withdrawn, because at that time his brain was no longer able to
function. The Uniform Brain Death Act27 stated that "for legal and
medical purposes an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation
Id. at 10.
The best known case raising the problem was the Karen Quinlan case, In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 57, 355 A.2d 647, 669, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), where the court concluded
that there was no "reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of that biological vegetative existence to which Karen
seems to be doomed."
24 Kennedy, Show Biz and the .Doctors-Why Panorama Was Wrong, The Sunday Times
(London), Nov. 30, 1980, § 1, at 16, col. 3.
25 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979).
26 Id. at 185, 603 P.2d at 77.
27 UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH Acr (1980).
22
23

816

BOOK REVIEWS

[Vol. 73

of all functioning of the brain including the brain stem, is dead." The
Harvard Medical School test, discussed by the Code commentators,28
defines "cessation of life" as "brain death" which occurs when there is
"(1) unresponsiveness to normally painful stimuli; (2) absence of spontaneous movements or breathing; and (3) absence of reflexes."
The court adopted the modern view and concluded that the victim
had suffered brain death before the supports had been withdrawn,
hence the defendant could properly be convicted of a homicide offense.29 No doubt, the victim was dead before the support systems were
withdrawn, and the defendant was the one who killed him. Without
any statutory guidelines as to the definition of death, however, all parties were acting under a severe handicap in predicting the result in the
case, surely raising some due process concerns. It is just this sort of case
which the Model Penal Code could and should reach. The failure to
define the crucial term, "death," is unfortunate, though perhaps not fatal. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, established by Congress in 1978, has just recommended that the states endorse the concept
that human life ends when the brain stops functioning. 30 The recommendation is receiving a good deal of attention and is likely to have a
major impact in the near future on the law in this area. Still, it is both
disappointing and surprising that the draftsmen of the Model Penal
Code chose not to develop their own definition of this term. 31
It is, finally, worth noting that under the homicide definition,
"human being" is a person "who has been born and is alive." Such a
definition maintains the earliest common law view that homicide offenses are only committed when the victim is born alive:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in
her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision [i.e., misdemeanor], and no murder; but if the childe be born alive and dyeth of the
potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a
reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive. 32

One of the obvious reasons for so limiting the definition was to avoid
28 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 10.

29

124 Ariz. at 185, 603 P.2d at 77.
The full statute is as follows:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards.
3! This is particularly surprising in light of the approach taken by the Code in the murder
and manslaughter sections. The draftsmen there were meticulous in their phraseology and
attempted to specify the elements of the offenses. Se-e zi!fi-a text accompanying notes 45-138.
32 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 58 (1648).
30
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dealing with the abortion question in the homicide area. "Although
there may remain a role for the penal law in the field of abortion, there
is at least a continuing necessity to avoid enmeshing this quite distinct
problem in the law of homicide."3 3 On this point the draftsmen and
commentators are certainly correct. The legal issues surrounding abortion are complex and diverse, but they are distinct from those normally
involved with the law of criminal homicide. It is preferable to deal with
such issues apart from the homicide area. 34
In one area, though, the limited definition of human being raises
some question, as recognized by the commentators. "Whatever one's
evaluation of [abortion], it seems useful to distinguish abortion from the
intentional killing of a fetus without the mother's consent. As a matter
of policy, it may be thought appropriate to punish such conduct as
murder." 35
Keeler v. Supenor Court 36 demonstrates this point very well. The defendant's former wife became pregnant by another man. One day, on
an isolated mountain road the defendant encountered her, saw that she
was pregnant and "pushed her against the car, shoved his knee into her
abdomen, and struck her in the face with several blows."37 There was
little question that the defendant intended to do severe harm to both the
mother and the fetus. 38 The head of the fetus was found to be severely
fractured, and it was delivered stillborn. The defendant was convicted
under a statute which defined murder as "the unlawful killing of a
human being, with malice aforethought." 39 The dissenting justices argued that the conviction was proper, for the question "whether a homicide occurred . . . would be determined by medical testimony regarding
the capability of the child to have survived prior to the defendant's
act." 40 The majority of the California supreme court disagreed, finding
that under the usual murder statute the legislature could not have intended to cover the defendant's actions. 41 If it had so intended, the statCOMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 12.
The abortion issues are dealt with in § 230.3 of the Code.
35 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 12.
36 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
37 Id. at 623, 470 P.2d at 618, 87 Cal. Rptr.at 482.
38 After noticing that his former wife was pregnant, the defendant exclaimed, "I'm going
to stomp it out of you." Id.
39 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970).
40 2 Cal. 3d at 641, 470 P.2d at 632, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 496 (Burke, C.J., dissenting). The
medical testimony was clear that the fetus had an excellent chance of survival, but for the
defendant's actions. "'Baby Girl' Vogt, . . . had reached the 35th week of development,
[and] had a 96 percent chance of survival . . . ." 2 Cal. 3d at 639-40, 470 P.2d at 630, 87
Cal. Rptr. at 494 (Burke, C.J., dissenting).
41 It is the policy of this state to construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendants
as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit; just as in
the case of a question of fact, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable
33

34
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ute "would deny him due process of law." 42
One could certainly draft a statute which does not deal with the
abortion situation, but does make into a homicide offense the beating of
a woman which results in the child being delivered stillborn. 43 What is
perplexing about the commentators' view of such a statute is that they
and the draftsmen have simply chosen not to deal with the sensitive
question. Many judges and legislators have grappled with the issue of
whether such a killing constitutes a homicide offense; 44 it is regrettable
that the Code does not offer guidance in this difficult area.
MURDER

The Model Penal Code, section 210.2, provides that
(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b),l 45 l criminal homicide
constitutes murder when:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and
indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing
or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by
force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.

It is in the definition of murder that the Model Penal Code has
made its greatest contribution. In an area fraught with confusion and
contradiction, the draftsmen and commentators have sought to bring
clarity and uniformity. On the whole, they have succeeded. At comdoubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a
statute . . . . We hold that in adopting the definition of murder in Penal Code section
187 the Legislature intended to exclude from its reach the act of killing an unborn fetus
The first essential of due process is fair warning of the act which is made punishable
as a crime. "That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary
notions of fair play and the settled rules of law". . . . "No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.". . .
This requirement of fair warning is reflected in the constitutional prohibition
against the enactment of ex post facto laws . . . . When a new penal statute is applied
retrospectively to make punishable an act which was not criminal at the time it was
performed, the defendant has been given no advance notice consistent with due process.
And precisely the same effect occurs when such an act is made punishable under a preexisting statute but by means of an unforeseeable;umi:ziz/ enlargement thereof.
ld. at 631, 633-34, 470 P.2d at 624, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 488, 490.
42 /d. at 639, 470 P.2d at 630, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
43 Illinois and California have both passed statutes which preclude application of the
homicide statute in cases where abortion was legally authorized. Su CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 187(b) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 9-l.l (1981) (specifically referring to
the new homicide offense of "feticide.").
44 &e COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 11-12.
45 This is the manslaugher section. &e itifia text accompanying notes 98-138.
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mon law, murder was the unlawful killing of another human being with
"malice aforethought." The term "malice aforethought," often clipped
to malice, has no specific definition suitable for use in the area of homicide.46 Instead, it is thought that killings in four situations evidence a
sufficiently criminal mind as to constitute murder. First, of course, malice includes an intent to kill. 47 Second, malice means an intent to inflict
grievous bodily harm. Third, the term includes the state of mind present under the genteel terminology of "depraved heart" or "abandoned
and malignant heart." This category covers those cases in which the defendant acted with extreme recklessness. The fourth situation, and the
most difficult for this writer,48 consists of killings committed during the
course of certain other crimes, felony murder. This clarity of categorization in the malice aforethought area may be more apparent than real,
for states were hardly consistent in the application of the doctrine, while
still others sought to embellish the term by statutory definition. 49
The confusion in this area was further compounded by the adoption of statutes dividing murder into degrees, a position first taken by
the state of Pennsylvania in 1794. "The thrust of this reform was to
confine the death penalty, which was then mandatory on conviction of
any common-law murder, to homicides judged particularly heinous."50
The murder was deemed sufficiently horrible if the killing had been
"perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other
kind of willful, deliberate or premeditated killing." 51 While one might
argue whether or not these standards were appropriate, it at least appeared clear what was meant by the statutory terminology. Unfortunately, the phrase "willful, deliberate or premeditated killing" in
practice was not at all clear.
'
The leading discussion of the definition of the terms under first degree murder statutes is probably Judge Leventhal's opinion in Austin v.
United States .52 There the defendant had brutally stabbed the victim to
46 Unlike, for instance, the definition of malice in the defamation area which refers to
knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. See New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 u.s. 254 (1964).
47 The intent to kill will normally be murder unless committed in the heat of passion
under the manslaughter statutes. See i'n.fta text accompanying notes 103-127.
48 See z;yia discussion at text accompanying notes 73-97.
49 The commentators refer to the Georgia code sections, since repealed, which defined the
term as "that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which
is manifested by external circumstances capable of prooP' or implied malice "where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 17.
50 ld. at 16.
51 This reference excludes the felony murder provisions which were present in the statutes
which otherwise divided murder into degrees.
52 382 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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death, inflicting dozens of knife wounds all over her body. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder after the trial judge had instructed the jury that the deliberation and premeditation under the first
degree murder statute could be "in the nature of hours, minutes, or
seconds." 53 Judge Leventhal began by exploring the rationale for the
first degree murder statute:
Statutes like ours, which distinguish deliberate and premeditated murder
from other murder, reflect a belief that one who meditates an intent to kill
and then deliberately executes it is more dangerous, more culpable or less
capable of reformation than one who kills on sudden impulse; or that the
prospect of the death penalty is more likely to deter men from deliberate
than from impulsive murder. The deliberate killer is guilty of first degree
murder; the impulsive killer is not. 54

What the legislature had in mind was "that the determination to kill
was reached calmly and in cold blood rather than under impulse or the
heat of passion and was reached some appreciable time prior to the
homicide."55 Thus, the trial judge's instruction to the jury was erroneous; by referring to the premeditation element as one which could be
committed in a matter of seconds, he had essentially converted virtually
all murders into first degree murders, an intent the legislature could not
have had. 56
Austin illustrates well the problems which the degree statutes created. The Model Penal Code approach rejects the degrees principle and
instead provides a clear and healthy balance between the requirements
of particular states of mind, and severe punishment for particular types
53 The court stated to the jury:
It is your duty to determine from all of the facts and the circumstances which have been
presented to you in this case that you may find surrounding the killing on April
24 . . . whether there was any reflection and consideration amounting to deliberation
by the defendant . . . . Now if there was such deliberation, even though it be of an
exceedingly brief duration, that is in itself, so far as the deliberation is concerned, is
sufficient. Because it is the fact of deliberation rather than the length of time it required
that is important. Although some time, that is there must be some time to deliberate in
the mind of the defendant Austin the premeditation and the deliberation. As I have told
you before, the time itself may be in the nature of hours, minutes, or seconds. But there
must be the deliberation and the premeditation.
ld. at 133, n.l.
54 /d. at 134 (quoting Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1941)).
55 ld. at 134.
56 The court stated:
In homespun terminology, intentional murder is in the first degree if committed in
cold blood, and is murder in the second degree if committed on impulse or in the sudden
heat of passion. These are the archtypes, that clarify by contrast. The real facts may be
hard to classify and may lie between the poles. A sudden passion, like lust, rage, or
jealousy, may spawn an impulsive intent yet persist long enough and in such a way as to
permit that intent to become the subject of a further reflection and weighing of consequences and hence to take on the character of a murder executed without compunction
and "in cold blood."
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of killings. 5 7 As indicated earlier, under the traditional view of malice,
murder was committed by a killing accompanied by an intent to kill, an
intent to inflict great bodily harm, or a "depraved heart."58 In the abstract, the terms-at least the first two--may be straightforward. In
practice, however, the terms were difficult to apply in the cases in which
the actor probably knew that he would cause death or great bodily
harm, but there was some question as to whether that result was his goal
or his purpose. For instance, did the husband intend to kill his wife when
he ordered her into the river and she drowned? 59 Did the "stepmother"
intend to kill her six year old girl when she "whipped" the child continuously?60 Similarly, did the defendant intend to inflict grave bodily harm
on his wife when he struck her and she bumped her head on the car? 61
In these cases the defendants certainly knew of the likely consequences
of their acts, but some doubt must be raised as to whether they intended
such consequences.
The Model Penal Code avoids this fine distinction between intent
and knowledge by allowing for a murder conviction if the killing was
done in a purposeful or knowing fashion. The commentators properly
remark that for homicide purposes there ought not to be any distinction
between an intentional killing and a knowing killing. The Code thus
rejects those statutes which so distinguish, either with regard to the definitions of the offenses or the grading of them for purposes of punishment.62 The commentators also make clear the nature of proof required
for intent, purpose or knowledge. That is, under the Code the judge
may not instruct the jury to presume that the defendant intended
the natural or probable consequences of his acts. Liability under Section
210.2(1)(a) may not rest merely on a finding that the defendant purposefully or knowingly did something which had death of another as its natural
and probable consequence. Rather, the prosecution must establish that
the defendant engaged in conduct with the conscious objective of causing
death of another or at least with awareness that death of another was practically certain to result from his act.63
This conclusion is quite proper; murder is the highest homicide offense
precisely because the defendant's culpability is the greatest. A murder
57 Id. at 137. The punishment provisions of the Code are not treated in this article. A
person convicted of murder, however, may be sentenced to death under certain circumstances
pursuant to § 210.6.
58 Or by a killing during the course of the commission of a felony. See il?fra text accompanying notes 73-97.
59 Yes, he knew she could not swim. State v. Myers, 7 N.J. 465, 81 A.2d 710 (1951).
60 Yes. State v. Lamborn, 452 S.W.2d 2'16 (Mo. 1970).
61 Yes, he should have immediately taken his wife to the hospital. People v. Geiger, 10
Mich. App. 348, 159 N.W.2d 383 (1968).
62 E.g., WISe. STAT. §§ 940.01-.03 (1979). See COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 20.
63 Id. at 20-21.
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charge should not stand upon so tenuous a ground as what somebody
else knew, or what a natural consequence should have been. Of course,
direct evidence of intent or knowledge is not required, and the jury may
be told that it can infer the necessary state of mind from the acts of the
defendant. That, however, is quite different-and far more justifiablethan an instruction as to presumptions of natural and probable
consequences.
Suppose the defendant does not intend to inflict grievous bodily
harm, does not intend to kill, and does not know that the death will
occur. Should the defendant be convicted of murder under other circumstances? Even today, few people would contest the murder conviction of the defendant who shoots a gun into a room, 64 shoots it into a
moving automobile, 65 or takes a small child and literally throws her into
her bedroom. 66 When death occurs the actor is seen as greatly at fault,
even though he may not have intended that death would result, or may
not have known that the victim would die. He is held for murder because he consciously disregarded a grave risk to a fellow human being.
In common law terms, he has evidenced an "abandoned and malignant
heart." The Code follows this rationale, but seeks to clarify the meaning
of the rule. The defendant can be held for murder when the act is
"committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Though the language is still a bit
hazy, it is a vast improvement over the common law terminology6 7 and
it achieves its "primary purpose of communicating to jurors in ordinary
language the task expected of them. " 68
Two points should be made concerning the extreme indifference
formulation. First, it is not indifference to any risk which will give rise to
a murder charge in this context. It is a risk which demonstrates the
defendant's total disregard for human life; it is the shooting of the gun,
the brutal treatment of the young child. Any action short of this "extreme indifference" can still be considered as a homicidal act, but only
at the level of manslaughter rather than murder. 69 Second, it should be
People v. Jematowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924).
Hill v. Commonweath, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931).
Seidler v. State, 64 Wise. 2d 456, 219 N.W.2d 320 (1974).
67 The language in the Code is certainly an improvement over other academic efforts in
the area. One law professor has defined murder to include unintentional homicide "by an act
so extremely dangerous and disregardful of the lives and safety of others as to be wantonly
disregardful of such interests according to the standard of the conduct of a reasonable man
under the circumstances." Moreland, A Suggested Homii:i(fe Statute.for Kentucky, 41 KY. L.J. 139,
146 (1953). Another has summarized the common law version of unintentional murder as
involving "wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human risk." R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAw 36-37, 46 (2d ed. 1969).
68 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 25.
69 Section 210.3 defines manslaughter as an act which is "committed recklessly."
64

65
66
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stressed that the murder charge can only be sustained on a showing of
conscious disregard of the risk of harm to others. It is not enough to
prove that the defendant should have been aware of the probable consequences, or that other people knew or would have known of the consequences. The murder charge requires a very high degree of culpability:
the actual awareness of this very great risk. The famous English case of
Regina v. Ward, 70 therefore, would not be valid under the Code, as noted
by the commentators. The defendant was a man of "sub-normal" intelligence who was charged with the murder of a small child. He testified
that he had picked up the crying child and shook her until she had
stopped. He had no intention to harm her seriously and apparently did
not understand that he was harming her. The thrust of his defense was
rejected by the trial judge who instructed the jury that
if, when he did the act which he did do, he must as a reasonable man have
contemplated that death or grievous bodily ha.-m was likely to result to the
child as a result of what he did, then, members of the jury, if you are
satisfied about that, he is guilty of murder. 71

Under the Code, this instruction is erroneous due to the reference to the
reliance on the standard of conduct of a "reasonable man." 72
The commentators state several times that under the Code a defendant can only be convicted of murder if he or she killed purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. The felony murder rule as such is not
found in the Code. Still, the rule may have been adopted sub silento by
the draftsmen in the form of the following presumption: "Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual
intercourse . . . arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape." To
determine if the rule finds new life in the Code we must first examine
the traditional felony murder doctrine.
At common law, all defendants committing a felony were held for
murder if the killing occurred during the course of that felony.
Problems arose in the application of the rule. There have been cases in
70 [1956] 1 Q,B. 351.
71 /d. at 354-55.
72 As the commentators point

out, Parliament overruled Ward in the Criminal Justice Act
of 1967, ch. 80, § 8:
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offense,(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his
actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those
actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the
evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the
circumstances.
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which the issue was whether a "killing" had occurred if the victim of the
crime dropped dead from a heart attack. 73 In other cases the defense
contended that the felony murder rule did not apply unless the killing
was in furtherance of the felony. 74 In numerous cases the defendants
asserted that the killing was not during the course of the crime because
the death occurred during the escape portion of the criminal endeavor. 75
Still, in virtually every American jurisdiction76 the rule was a well established alternative to the other forms of malice aforethought for purposes
of proving murder.
The purpose of the felony murder rule has never been entirely
clear. Chief Justice Traynor stated that it was "to deter felons from
killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible
for killings they commit." 77 At a time when all felonies were punishable
by death "it made little difference whether the actor was convicted of
murder or of the underlying felony because the sanction was the
same. " 78 A broad based felony murder rule is indefensible in the modern world, where all kinds of acts which are not particularly dangerous
to life and are not given severe penalties are designated felonies. 79 As
the commentators properly remark, under the rule, the "homicide, as
73 People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1969)
("So long as life is s,hortened as a result of the felonious act, it does not matter that the victim
might have died soon anyway. In this respect, the robber takes his victim as he finds him.'').
74 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waters, 491 Pa. 85, 92, 418 A.2d 312, 316 (1980) (it was
"error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct the jury that the state was required to show the
conduct causing the death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony.'').
75 See, e.g., Whitman v. People, 161 Colo. 110,420 P.2d 416 (1966) (felony murder rule
applied to killings which occurred during the escape from the commission of an offense).
76 Until the last decade, only Ohio had abandoned the felony murder rule. As pointed
out by the commentators, however, vestiges of the rule remain even in Ohio.
A close relative of the felony-murder rule is continued, however, under the label of imputed intent. A person who joins with another in a crime of violence is presumed to have
agreed to whatever acts may be necessary to accomplish the criminal objective. Thus,
each participant in an armed robbery may be presumed to have had a purpose to kill in
connection with an unplanned but foreseeable homicide committed incident to the
robbery.
COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 33 n.80.
77 People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445
(1965).
78 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 31 n.74, states:
The primary use of the felony murder rule at common law therefore was to deal with a
homicide that occurred in furtherance of an attempted felony that failed. Since attempts
were punished as misdemeanors, . . . the use of the felony murder rule allowed the
courts to punish the actor in the same manner as if his· attempt had succeeded. Thus, a
conviction for attempted robbery was a misdemeanor, but a homicide committed in the
attempt was murder and punishable by death.
79 In Illinois, for instance, the following offenses are classified as felonies in the criminal
code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1.1 (1981) (syndicated gambling);§ 29-1, 29-2 (offering or
accepting a bribe); § 31-4 (obstructing justice);§ 32-3 (subornation of perjury);§ 32-8 (tampering with public records); § 21-1 (criminal damage to property); and§ 17-3 (forgery).
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distinct from the underlying felony, was thus an offense of strict liability."80 It is difficult, indeed, to justify a murder conviction under such a
strict liability rationale. As a practical matter, there has been no evidence to demonstrate that the felony murder rule serves a useful purpose
in actually deterring felons from killing negligently or accidentally. 81
More substantively, "it remains indefensible in principle to use the sanctions that the law employs to deal with murder unless there is at least a
finding that the actor's conduct manifested an extreme indifference to
the value of human life. "82
State legislators and judges have recognized the validity of the criticism in the Commentaries and have stepped back from the formerly
broad view of the felony murder rule. As the commentators discuss, the
rule has been limited in a number of significant ways, whether by statute or court decision .. In some states only particularly dangerous felonies
are covered under the rule. 83 In other states, the felony must be one
which is independent of the homicide itself. Hence, assault with a
deadly weapon could not be the base felony under the rule because the
assault is an offense included in the charge ofhomicide.84 In some jurisdictions the punishment has been downgraded. 85 Still other states have
flatly rejected the felony murder rule. 86 Foremost of these jurisdictions
is the state of Michigan which declared its position in the case of People v.
Aaron.87 The state supreme court first looked to "the most basic principle of the criminal law in general . . . criminal liability for causing a
80
81

COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 31.
Indeed, the evidence is somewhat to the contrary. ''There is no basis in experience for
thinking that homicides which the evidence nzalces accidental occur with disproportionate frequency in connection with specified felonies." COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 38 (emphasis
in original). The statistical evidence cited by the commentators shows that the number of all
homicides which occur during the course of robbery, burglary, and rape is somewhat lower
than might otherwise be expected. Id. at 38 n.96.
82 Id. at 38-39.
83 A number of codes specify the felonies which can be the basis for the rule. &e, e.g., ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1979). Some courts have attempted to limit the felony murder rule
to the felonies which, in the abstract, are inherently dangerous to human life. For criticism of
the rule, see COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 35.
84 For a dissenting view, see State v. Thompson, 88 Wash. 3d 13, 558 P.2d 202, appeal
dismissed, 434 U.S. 898 (1977).
85 Alaska, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah have reduced the felony murder
crime to second degree murder. See discussion in People v. Aaron, ziifi'a, 409 Mich. 672, 689,
299 N.W.2d 304, 315 {1980).
86 Even in those states which have not acted in such drastic fashion, severe restrictions
have been imposed with respect to the foreseeability of the offense, especially with regard to
killings not directly caused by the defendant or a co-defendant. See, e.g., State v. Williams,
254 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Jackson v. State, 92 N.M. 461, 589 P.2d 1052
(1979). Contra, People v. Hickman, 59 Ill.2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974); Jackson v. State, 286
Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979).
87 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
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particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental
state in respect to that result." 88 The court had little difficulty in concluding that
[t]he most fundamental characteristic of the felony-murder rule violates
this basic principle in that it punishes all homicides, committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of proscribed felonies whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the
relation between the homicide and the perpetrator's state of mind. This is
most evident when a killing is done by one of a group of co-felons. The
felony-murder rule completely ignores the concept of determination of
guilt on the basis of individual misconduct. The felony-murder rule thus
"erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability."89

The court then speculated that the impact of the abolition of the felony
murder rule would be limited:
From a practical standpoint, the abolition of the category of malice arising
from the intent to commit the underlying felony should have little effect on
the result of the majority of cases. In many cases where felony murder has
been applied, the use of the doctrine was unnecessary because the other
types of malice could have been inferred from the evidence.
Abrogation of this rule does not make irrelevant the fact that a death
occurred in the course of a felony. A jury can properly infer malice from
evidence that a defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause
death or great bodily harm. . . . Thus, whenever a killing occurs in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony,
. . . in order tQ establish malice the jury may consider the "nature of the
underlying felony and the circumstances surrounding its commission."
If the jury concludes that malice existed, they can find murder. . . .
As previously noted, in many circumstances the commission of a felony, particularly one involving violence or the use of force, will indicate an
intention to kill, an intention to cause great bodily harm, or wanton or
willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant's
behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Thus, the felony-murder
rule is not necessary to establish mens rea in these cases.90

While few courts or legislatures have gone as far as the Aaron
court,91 it is beyond dispute that the modern trend is for severe limitation of the traditional felony murder rule. One would, therefore, hope
for and expect repudiation of the rule in the Model Penal Code and its
Commentaries. The rule is expressly repudicated, but the essense of it
seems to survive. The Code "creates a presumption of the required reck88 /d. at 708, 299 N.W.2d at 316.
89 /d., 299 N.W.2d at 317.
90 /d. at 729-30,299 N.W.2d at 327.

Sualso COMMENTARIES,mpra note 1, at 37 ("For the
vast majority of cases it is probably true that homicide occurring during the commission or
attempted commission of a felony is murder independent of the felony-murder rule.'~.
91 In addition to Ohio, the states of Kentucky and Hawaii have specifically abolished the
felony murder doctrine. See discussion in People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. at 690, 299 N.W.2d at
314.
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lessness and extreme indifference, however, if a homicide occurs during
the commission or attempted commission of robbery, sexual attack, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or felonious escape." 92 This presumption
also applies to the person who is an accomplice to the commission of one
of the specified crimes. The important question is whether this presumption differs in material form from the felony murder.
The Model Penal Code's approach is different from the traditional
rule in that the jurors are said to be free to disregard the "presumption."93 Thus, the commentators conclude that the effect of the Code
provision "is to abandon felony murder as a separate basis for establishing liability for homicide." 94 Two responses must be made to this conclusion. First, there is considerable doubt whether the jurors will
disregard the presumption, especially in cases in which no independent
evidence is offered as to the recklessness state of mind. That is, as I read
the presumption, the jurors may find (indeed, are encouraged to find)
the necessary state of mind with no evidence other than the commission
of the named felonies. This looks suspiciously like the felony murder
rule. Second, and more fundamentally, what possible basis can exist for
the presumption here? The commentators refer to the presumption "as
a concession to the facilitation of proof."95 If, however, the felony murder rule is wrong because it fails to require "a finding ~hat_ the actor's
conduct manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human
life,"96 it would seem that the presumption is just as wrong. A finding of
extreme indifference is required, but that requirement can be met
merely by a showing that the defendant or a co-defendant committed a
particular felony. The draftsmen and commentators remark that
"[p]rincipled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is hard to
find," 97 yet it is also hard to find a principled argument in favor of the
presumption in the Code.
MANSLAUGHTER

The Model Penal Code, section 210.3, provides that
92 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 29.
93 Id. at 30. It is doubtful that the commentators mean to continue using the term "presumption" in this context. It appears more likely that they intend to use the term "inference"
which would allow the jury to reject the evidence with no contrary showing. If they truly
mean presumption in the sense that the burden of proving this element (recklessness) is on the
defendant, serious constitutional questions would have to be raised in light of Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See gmerai!J'
Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales ofJustiCe: Burdens ofPersuasion in Cn"minal Cases, 86 YALE
L.J. 1299 (1977). See also ziyra note 124.
94 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 30,

95 Id.
96

Id. at 39.

97 Id.

at 37.
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(1)

Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
(a) it is committed recklessly; or
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of
such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be.

At the time the Model Penal Code was drafted the state of the law
with respect to the offense of manslaughter was muddled, to say the
least. Some states divided the crime into two types, voluntary and involuntary.98 Other states did not even attempt to define the crime, simply
incorporating the common law offense. At common law, manslaughter
was a "catch-all" category covering homicides which were not considered murder. This usually involved intentional killings accompanied by
adequate provocation and reckless killings that did not rise to the level
of "depraved heart" murder. 99 Still other states adopted statutes which
divided the crime into degrees. 100 Hence, in a very real sense, the major
contribution of the draftsmen here was to bring some uniformity to the
crime in those states which have adopted the Code.
The first type of manslaughter recognized by the Code is the reckless killing of another. Carefully distinguishing negligent homicide, 101
the Code mandates a showing that the defendant "consciously disregards a substantial ar1d injustifiable risk." It is considerably more difficult to prove this reckless conduct than to prove negligent acts; the
section requires behavior which is "a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe," and proof is required of a "conscious disregard of perceived homicidal risk." 102 If the
risk creation demonstrates "extreme indifference," the crime is murder
rather than manslaughter.
The second type of manslaughter is the killing in the heat of pas98 The traditional view is that voluntary manslaughter is committed when there is an
intent to kill, but no malice aforethought. Involuntary manslaughter is committed without
this intent to kill, but upon otherwise culpable behavior. The division, however, was not so
explicitly recognized as in many of the statutory provisions. See COMMENTARIES, supra note
1, at 44-48.
99 This form of manslaughter thus required more culpability than for ordinary civil negligence, but less than for the "abandoned heart" murder. Id. at 44.
100 Foremost among these statutes was the New York law which allowed for first degree
manslaughter when the killing occurred in the heat of passion in a cruel and unusual manner
and second degree manslaughter in the heat of passion, but not by means either cruel or
unusual. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 1050, 1052 (McKinney 1909) (repealed 1965).
101 Section 210.4 states:· "Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is
committed negligently." The discussion of the commentators in the section is quite helpful,
but reference to it in this article is deleted because of space limitations.
102 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 53.
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sion as a result of severe provocation. Wharton states the policy for allowing a lesser penalty even though the killing was intentional: "As a
concession to human frailty, a killing, which would otherwise constitute
murder, is mitigated to voluntary manslaughter." 103 The common law
had difficulties defining this aspect of the crime and applying it in a
manner consistent with the underlying policy. The greater the heat of
passion and the more severe the provocation, the greater chance that the
crime would be considered manslaughter rather than murder. The oftstated theory was that if this was the kind of incident which would cause
even a reasonable person to lose self-control the law ought not hold the
defendant to the sanction for murder. The problem, though, was that
"a reasonable person does not kill even when provoked." 104 As explained by Wechsler and Michael, the policy rationale stated above is
nonetheless served by allowing mitigation to the manslaughter charge:
[T]he more strongly [most persons] would be moved to kill by circumstances of the sort which provoked the actor to the homicidal act, and the
more difficulty they would experience in resisting the impulse to which he
yielded, the less does his succumbing serve to differentiate his character
from theirs. 105

The Model Penal Code has sought to effectively eliminate three
major problems involved in applying the provocation rules: first, the
requirement that the provocation be sufficient to affect even the reasonable person; second, the view that words alone were insufficient to constitute adequate provocation; and third, the provision that there could
be no break in time between the provocation and the defendant's action.
Determining what a reasonable person would or would not do
under difficult circumstances has never been an easy task for finders of
fact, as seen in the many conflicting negligence cases in tort law. 10 6 The
reasonable person standard does, however, allow for a specific objective
standard upon which persons could rely. In the criminal context, however, some question was raised as to whether the reasonable person standard should be used to determine adequate provocation. As noted by
·the commentators, "[a] taunting attack that would seem trivial to the
2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 153 (14th ed. 1978).
supra note 1, at 56.
105 Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Ifomid'de II, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 1261,
1281 (1937).
106 Learned Hand attempted to devise a formulation to assist in the tort negligence decision. He wrote that the negligence determination "is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability [of the result]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury . . . ; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions." He went on to explain: "Possibly it serves to bring this notion into
relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is
less than] PL." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947).
103

104 CoMMENTARIES,
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ordinary citizen may be extremely threatening to the blind man." 107
Commonwealth v. Staslco 108 demonstrates well the refusal to consider the
individual traits of the defendant which might have led him to be provoked. The defendant attempted at trial to offer medical evidence to
show his "tendency to have a short temper and erupt in sudden rages."
The trial judge's refusal to allow the evidence into the record was
affirmed:
The purpose of the testimony was to show that, in the case of this particular accused, there was sufficient provocation for the attack. This evidence
was clearly inadmissible: "Our law is quite explicit that the determination
of whether a certain quantum of provocation is sufficient to support the
defense of voluntary manslaughter is purely an objective standard. . . . "
The test for adequate provocation is "whether a reasonable man, confronted with this series of events, became impassioned to the extent that his
mind was incapable of cool reflection." 109

Indeed, in one case evidence was refused, even though the court conceded that the evidence would have shown the defendant to be "a man
with a low intelligence quotient and a history of mental disturbance
. . . [as the] objective standard precludes consideration of the innate
peculiarities of the individual defendant." 110
The Code seeks to start anew in this area, for it "sweeps away the
rigid rules that limited provision to certain defined circumstances. Instead, it casts the issue in phrases that have no common-law antecedents
and hence no accumulated doctrinal content." 111 Manslaughter is
shown when the killing is "committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse." While the Code does retain the reasonable person standard, this requirement may be met by looking to "the viewpoint of a
person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be." It thus appears that the Code strikes a healthy balance
between the opposing positions. Some reasonable person standard must
be met, so that the section "preserves the essentially objective character
of the inquiry and erects a barrier against debilitating individualization
of the legal standard." 112 Still, the reasonableness must be assessed
"from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation." "[I]t is clear
that personal handicaps and some external circumstances must be taken
COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 56.
471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977).
109 Id. at 384, 370 A.2d at 356 (guoting Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 389-90,
292 A.2d 286, 289-90 (1972)).
110 State v. Jackson, 226 Kan. 302, 309, 597 P.2d 255, 259 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 952
(1980). &e also Bedder v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1954) 2 All E.R. 801. But see
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin [1978) 2 All E.R. 168.
111 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 61.
112 Id. at 62.
107
108
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into account. Thus, blindness, shock from traumatic injury, and extreme grief are all easily read into the term 'situation.' " 113
The common law also had trouble defining the sort of external activity which would give rise to the provocation defense. The rule traditionally was that "words alone, however scurrilous or insulting, will not
furnish the adequate provocation required.'' 114 The major exception to
the "mere words" rule, as noted by the commentators, "concerned informational words disclosing a fact that would have been adequate provocation had the actor observed it himself," 115 such as the case in which
the defendant is told, "I just killed your child.'' Under the code, no
explicit rule is promulgated with respect to "mere words.'' The Code
draftsmen recognized that the important question "cannot be resolved
successfully by categorization of conduct. It must be confronted directly
on the facts of each case.'' 116 In most cases words alone will not be sufficient provocation. In the highly unusual case, however, mere words
might be sufficient to cause even the reasonable person to lose selfcontrol.117
At common law a manslaughter claim was not allowed if there was
a cooling off period between the provocation and the killing. The final
contribution of the Code in this area is the elimination of this "sudden
provocation" element. The reason for the strict rule was that "[f]or the
reasonable man, at least, passion subsides and reason reasserts its sway
as the provoking event grows stale.'' 118 The most famous case in the
area, discussed by the commentators, is State v. Gounagi(zs 119 where "the
deceased committed sodomy on the unconscious defendant and subsequently spread the news of his accomplishment. Those who learned of
the event taunted and ridiculed the defendant until he finally lost control and killed his assailant some two weeks after the sodomy." 120
This theory of the cumulative effect of reminders of former wrongs, not of
new acts of provocation by the deceased, is contrary to the idea of sudden
anger as understood in the doctrine of mitigation. In the nature of the
thing sudden anger cannot be cumulative. A provocation which does not
cause instant resentment, but which is only resented after being thought
upon and brooded over, is not a provocation sufficient in law to reduce
Id.
State v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 590, 592 P.2d 185, 187 {1979) (guoting State v. Nevares, 36
N.M. 41, 44-45, 7 P.2d 933, 935 (1932)).
115 CoMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 58.
116 Id. at 61.
117 As in People v. Borchers, 50 Cal. 2d 321, 325 P.2d 97 {1958), where the wife told her
husband, the defendant, that she had been unfaithful, asked him to kill her and her four-yearold child, and taunted him by calling him a "chicken."
118 COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 59.
119 88 Wash. 304, 153 P. 9 (1915).
120 CoMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 59.
113

114
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The problem with the rule is that the law should not necessarily
distinguish between the person who instantly reacts to the provocation
and the person who broods for a week or two and then responds. The
Code recognizes this, and does not set out a specific rule with respect to
the suddenness of the situation. The validity of the Code's position is
seen in cases such as People v. Berry. 122 The victim in that case, defendant's wife, was a suicidally inclined young woman who pursued her
death wish by "sexually arousing him and taunting him into jealous
rages in an unconscious desire to provoke him into killing her and thus
consummating her desire for suicide." 123 For a two week period she continually harassed defendant with sexual taunts and incitements, and repeated references to her involvement with another man. Finally, the
defendant strangled her to death. Under the "sudden passion" rule the
defendant would not have been able to prove his defense. 124 The court,
however, recognized that the
two-week period of provocatory conduct by his wife . . . could arouse a
passion of jealousy, pain and sexual rage in an ordinary man of average
disposition such as to cause him to act rashly from this passion. . . .
The Attorney General contends that the killing could not have been
done in the heat of passion because there was a cooling period . . . .
However, the long course of provocatory conduct, which had resulted in
intermittent outbreaks of rage under specific provocation in the past,
reached its final culmination . . . . 125

The Model Penal Code treatment of manslaughter is a "modified
121 88 Wash. at 314, 153 P. at 14. See also People v. Wilson, 3 Ill. App. 3d 481, 486, 278
N.E.2d 473, 477 (1972) ("To reduce an unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter, the sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation cannot be fol~
lowed by a period of time sufficient for the passion to cool and the voice of reason to be
heard.'').
122 18 Cal. 2d 504, 556 P.2d 777, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1976).
123 Id. at 514, 556 P.2d at 780, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
124 The Model Penal Code requires the government to prove the elements of the voluntary
mamlaughter offense, though some states required the accused to prove the provocation
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. As the commentators point out, there has been
some question as to the constitutionality of placing this burden on the defendant. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) the Supreme Court struck down a state statute which
required the defendant to prove provocation by preponderance of the evidence. But see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) where the Court upheld the constitutionality of
requiring the defendant to shoulder the burden under a state statute which referred to emotional distrubance. The Court found that the emotional disturbance element, unlike the
provocation aspect in Mullaney, raised an affirmative defense. "The Model Code takes . . .
the . . . position advanced as a constitutional rule by Mr. Justice Powell's dissent in Patterson,
that, once the defendant has come forward with some evidence of extreme emotional disturbance, the burden of proving its non-existence should shift to the prosecution.'' COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 63-64 n.58. &e also supra note 93.
125 18 Cal. 3d at 515-16, 556 P.2d at 780-81, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
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and substantially enlarged version of the rule of provocation." 126 This
expansion is thoroughly justified, however, for it realistically allows the
important questions regarding mitigation of the crime to be placed
before the jury without any strict categories as to time or type of behavior required. It allows the jury to apply a standard which is both subjective and objective. In short, it is a substantial improvement over the
uncertainties of the common law. 12 7
I turn now to another situation. Suppose the defendant shoots and
kills the victim, believing that the victim was about to shoot and kill
him. The defendant's belief, though genuinely held, is unreasonable.
Had this mistaken belief been reasonable, the defendant would be able
to raise a complete, or "perfect," claim of self-defense. Under the traditional provocation rule, the hypothetical defendant would be convicted
of murder because he had the intent to kill and could not claim to have
been aroused by the "heat of passion." Recognizing this "as an indefensible position" 128 the Code has adopted a version of the "imperfect"
right of self-defense. The standard version, as enacted in Illinois, focuses
attention on the defendant's sincere, but unreasonable belief: "A person
who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary
manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances
to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing
. . ., but his belief is unreasonable." 129 The Code treatment of the imCOMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 60.
The Commentaries also discuss the diminished responsibility concept. The commentators clearly support the notion that "all evidence logically relevant to establishing the actor's
state of mind" should be admissible. COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 66. This, of course,
reiterates the point that the individual characteristics of the defendant ought to be considered
to some extent in determining provocation and the reaction of the defendant. With r~pect to
the question of allowing diminished responsibility to reduce murder to manslaughter, however, the commentators are far less certain:
Recognizing diminished responsibility as an alternative ground for reducing murder to
manslaughter undermines this scheme. Unlike provocation, diminished responsibility is
entirely subjective in character. It looks into the actor's mind to see whether he should
be judged by a lesser standard than that applicable to ordinary men. It recognizes the
defendant's own mental disorder or emotional instability as a basis for partially excusing
his conduct. This position undoubtedly achieves a closer relation between criminal liability and moral guilt.
/d. at 71. The commentators conclude that the Code does not recognize diminished responsibility as a distinct category of mitigation, but "leaves the issue, together with many others, as
part of the generic problem of determining the extent to which the actor's individual characteristics should be taken into account in the formula." /d. at 73.
128 /d.
129 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-2(b) {1979). &e also People v. Joyner, 50 Ill. 2d 302, 309,
278 N.E.2d 756, 759 {1972):
Occasionally a defendant who raises a defense of self-defense to a charge of murder is
convicted of manslaughter . . . . The difference between a justified killing under selfdefense and the one not justified, amounting to voluntary manslaughter, is that in the
former instance the belief that the use of force is necessary is reasonable under the circumstances, and in the latter, the belief is unreasonable.
126
127
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perfect defense is preferable to this version simply because it is more
precise. It allows for a manslaughter conviction in the situation discussed above, but specifies that the defendant could be guilty of criminal homicide if his belief was formed recklessly or negligently. 130
The final area in the law of manslaughter in which the Code has
made an important contribution is the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule,
an offshoot of the felony murder rule. As with felony murder, the broad
scope of the rule provided that it was a homicide offense if the defendant
caused a death while committing, or attempting to commit, a crime.
Although a number of courts have narrowly construed the rule 131 it is,
nevertheless, "objectionable on the same ground as the felony-murder
rule. It dispenses with proof of culpability and imposes liability for a
serious crime without reference to the actor's state of mind." 132 To be
sure, it is even worse than the felony murder rule, for the defendant may
be charged with a homicide offense even though he may not have committed any serious offense and might not be chargeable with generally
reckless conduct. 133
People v. Nelson 134 is perhaps the most extreme application of the
misdemeanor-manslaughter rule. The defendant was an elderly man,
formerly a tenant, who eventually became the owner of his building.
Two persons were killed in a fire which occurred in the building. The
government showed that a violation of the building law, a misdemeanor, caused the deaths. The defendant contended that he did not
know of the building law and thus had not acted in a reckless fashion.
The trial judge would not let the jury consider the issue of the defendant's knowledge, and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed. 135
The dissenter disagreed:
130 It is difficult to imagine many situations in which the defendant would be able to state
a legitimate self-defense argument when he was reckless as to the mistaken belief in the necessity. If recklessness requires a conscious disregard of a substantial risk with respect to the
necessity of defense, the prosecution may properly argue that he truly did not believe he was
entitled to use force and hence ought to be guilty of murder.
131 For example, some states apply the rule only to misdemeanors mala i'n se but not to
misdemeanors mala prohz"bi'ta. Others refuse to apply the rule where the underlying crime is
one of strict liability. But see ziifi-a text accompanying notes 134-38. The commentators discuss these limitations in some detail. COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 76-77.
132 Id. at 77.
133 In a situation involving a serious crime such as rape or armed robbery, it would not be
difficult for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant had consciously disregarded a
very serious risk, proven by his involvement in such a violent crime. The death of the victim
could more justifiably be considered criminal homicide.
134 309 N.Y. 231, 128 N.E.2d 391 (1955).
135 The court stated:
It is undeniable that a tremendous duty is placed upon the owners and those in charge of
property under the applicable section of the Multiple Dwelling Law; however, it is quite
apparent that the Legislature intended the burden to be onerous so that owners would
be impressed with the consequences flowing from violation of the statute, which viola-
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If awareness of the misdemeanor is held to be irrelevant, the basis for
guilt of manslaughter is eliminated. . . .
" . . . When there is a general intent to do evil, in other words, of
which evil the wrong actually done may be looked upon as a probable
incident, then the party having such general intent is to be regarded as
having intended the particular wrong." 136

Nelson demonstrates how indefensible the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule is. Even though the defendant may have committed the substantive crime, it is wrong to hold him for a homicide offense without a
showing of a culpable state of mind. Unlike the presumption adopted in
the felony-murder area, 137 the approach of the Code draftsmen here is
straightforward. They expressly abolish the misdemeanor-manslaughter
rule. This approach is quite proper. If the defendant acted in an otherwise reckless or negligent fashion, he may be charged with homicide. If
he has not acted culpably, even though guilty of a misdemeanor, he
should not be brought within the reach of a manslaughter statute. 138
CONCLUSION

The approach of the Model Penal Code in the area of criminal
homicide is illustrative of the general approach of the Code. There are
several difficult subjects which the draftsmen have chosen to deal with
in a direct and clear fashion; others have been avoided or obfuscated.
For example, the draftsmen were careful to define with clarity the elements of the crime of manslaughter, avoiding the common law difficulties. They explicitly rejected those murder statutes which had divided
the offense into degrees. On the other hand, they have failed to come to
tenns with important definitions such as "death," they have refused to
confront the possibility of a feticide statute, and have only partiaJly responded to the intense criticism of the felony murder.
The great worth of the Code cannot, however, be evaluated by
looking to such specifics. The Code has had tremendous influence on
the criminal law in this country and has brought consi,derable clarity
tions could so readily endanger human life in the congested conditions under which people must live in the City of New York.
/d. at 236, 128 N.E.2d at 394.
136 /d. at 239, 128 N.E.2d at 395 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 WHARTON's
CRIMINAL LAw § 157 (12th ed. 1932)).
137 &e supra text accompanying notes 73-97.
138 Related to the misdemeanor manslaughter rule is the so-called intent to injure rule. As
stated by the commentators, many jurisdictions have provisions in which "one who caused
the death of another by a simple battery was generally guilty of manslaughter or of involuntary manslaughter where that was a separate category, however improbable the fatal result."
CoMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 78. The imposition of homicide sanctions makes little sense
absent some reckless or negligent conduct apart from the battery itself. The Code rejects the
intent to injure rule and simply focuses on whether the defendant's action is reckless or negligent in determining which, if any, homicide category should be applied.
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and uniformity to an area of the law in which both were notoriously
absent. The efforts of Professors Low and Jeffries _will serve further to
clarify and explain the rationale for the Code, allowing lawyers, judges
and legislators to understand the positions taken by the draftsmen and
intelligently to decide whether such positions are supportable. The
commentators' efforts are both substantial and significant. By updating
the explanations for the Code provisions they have provided an invaluable aid to those engaged in the administration of criminal justice.
PAUL MARCUS
PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW

PRISONS AND POLITICS. By Richard A. McGee. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981. Pp. xiv, 162. $21.95.
Those in the business of crisis prediction should have little difficulty
recognizing one that's as sure a bet as any for the 1980s-the crisis of
America's burgeoning prisons. The criminal justice system responded to
the crime explosion of the 1960s and '70s, a period in which the homicide rate doubled, with an unprecedented expansion in our prison and
jail populations-from 356,000 in 1970 to 530,000 by 1977. With most
indicators pointing to a continuation of the upward trend in inmate
populations, only the most optimistic and least informed could not be
concerned about the potential for upheaval in our nation's prisons by
1990.
Under such circumstances, we would be foolish not to do our best
to understand the lessons of previous episodes of turmoil in our prisons,
as well as a few episodes of success that have occurred here and there, so
as to avoid repeating past errors and make use of what has worked. In
sharing his treasure of personal experience as a prison administrator in
the states of New York, Washington, and California, Richard McGee, in
Prisons and Politics, provides the means to enable others to understand
such lessons. McGee's account of the problems of prison administration
and how he has dealt with them is both thoughtful and thorough. His
grasp of the fundamental issues is deep:
Public officials . . . know instinctively that their prisons are unflattering reflections of their cultures. All societies have difficulty reconciling
their desire to be humane and compassionate with their exasperation with
overt antisocial behavior. To hurt and heal, to banish and forgive, to destroy and rebuild: these difficult and contradictory concepts come face to
face in their starkest form in prison. (p. 84.)

McGee's credentials in prison administration are second to none.

